Evaluation of power market designs on investment incentives and capacity adequacy Evaluation of power market designs on investment incentives and capacity adequacy

Evaluation of power market designs on investment incentives and capacity adequacy

  • 期刊名字:中国工程科学(英文版)
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  • 论文作者:Cai Shenghua,Tetsuo Tezuka
  • 作者单位:Graduate School of Energy Science
  • 更新时间:2023-04-19
  • 下载次数:
论文简介

Electricity industry restructuring should not sacrifice supply security to pursue economic efficiency. Till now there is no academic consensus on which electricity market design provides the least distorting investment incentives. Alternative approaches that have been adopted around the world for ensuring the appropriate level of investment in elec-tric generation capacity are discussed, and much attention is devoted on the evaluation of capacity payment systems.The finding is that on one hand, capacity payment systems have good effect on reducing spot market price volatility and increasing.the volume of generating capacity at the costs of relatively high total electricity prices;on the other hand, however, they are not robust against either the abuse of market power in the energy market or being manipulated.

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