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利比亚2003年决定放弃大规模杀伤性武器（WMD）计划并支持恐怖主义，与此相关的外交被正确地当作一种模式。经过多年的孤立和国际制裁，利比亚独裁者卡扎菲决定改变路线。他同意拆除并遣返大部分核设施，销毁化学武器库存和弹道导弹，并放弃将恐怖主义作为外交政策工具。利比亚希望基本实现正常化，并准备为此付出代价，但也希望获得这种正常化的好处。 在这方面，利比亚不仅是如何实施制裁，而且是如何解除制裁的一个有益的试验案例。尽管作为制裁故事的一部分常常被忽视，但一旦实施制裁，对制裁的救济与实施制裁的方式一样重要。这是因为制裁不仅仅是剥夺资源或与对手接触；制裁还旨在为其他潜在制裁目标提供客观教训。因此，重要的是，制裁的实施应被视为具有侵略性和彻底性，而且制裁的减免也应被视为对那些有朝一日可能发现自己处于未来制裁努力的接受端的国家切实有效。如果制裁是为了达到外交杠杆的目的，对不当行为造成后果，那么受制裁者也必须能够向国内外听众表明，救济是有好处的。 根据对数据和轶事历史的回顾，似乎有足够的理由支持这样一种观点，即制裁对利比亚经济（最终对其决策者）产生影响，制裁也被取消。关于这一结论，数据和历史记录不一致。毕竟，尽管利比亚的经济增长逐渐放缓，但并没有像通常所预期的那样，全面的经济制裁也没有见底。同样，尽管2004年后利比亚经济确实增长了，投资也增加了，但利比亚石油出口也同时增加，这也挫伤了人们对制裁解除效果的热情。此外，考虑到考虑的时间跨度，在伊拉克对利比亚战略思维施加沉重压力后，卡扎菲担心9/11事件后利比亚可能成为继阿富汗之后的下一个窝藏恐怖分子的国家或拥有一个新的大规模杀伤性武器计划等其他问题也可能成为类似的入侵原因。但制裁确实对利比亚的决策和改善经济的能力起到了制约作用。此外，归根结底，利比亚官员自己肯定的解除对利比亚制裁的愿望，是当时利比亚战略计谋的一部分，这导致利比亚官员和卡扎菲亲自改变利比亚政策，在大规模杀伤性武器扩散和恐怖主义方面有利于国际利益。 对于未来的救济情况，有两项建议是如何最好地评估制裁救济的绩效。
The diplomacy associated with Libya’s 2003 decision to abandon its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and support for terrorism has been rightly held up as a model. After years of isolation and international sanctions, Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi decided to change course. He agreed to dismantle and repatriate most of his nuclear infrastructure, to eliminate his chemical weapon stocks and ballistic missiles, and to abandon the use of terrorism as a foreign policy instrument. Libya wanted to be largely normalized and was prepared to pay a price to achieve this end but also wanted to receive the benefits of this normalization. In this, Libya represents a useful test case for not only how sanctions can be imposed but also for how they can be relieved. Though often ignored as a component of the sanctions story, relief from sanctions once imposed is as important as the manner of their imposition. This is because sanctions are not just about denial of resources or access to an adversary; they are also intended to serve as an object lesson for other potential sanctions targets. For this reason, it is important that sanctions imposition is seen as aggressive and thorough but also that sanctions relief is seen as tangible and useful to those that may—one day—find themselves on the receiving end of a future sanctions effort. If sanctions are to serve their purpose for diplomatic leverage by inflicting consequences for misbehavior, then those who are made subject to them must also be able to articulate to audiences both at home and abroad that relief has its benefits. Based on a review of the data and anecdotal history, there appears to be sufficient grounds to support the contention that sanctions had an effect on Libya’s economy (and eventually on its decision-makers), as well as did their removal. There are inconsistencies in the data and historical record with respect to this conclusion. After all, though Libyan economic growth petered out, it did not bottom out as wide-ranging economic sanctions would normally intend. Likewise, though the Libyan economy did grow and investment increased after 2004, the fact that Libyan oil exports also increased at the same time dampens the enthusiastic case for the effects of sanctions relief. Moreover, considering the arc of time under consideration, it is possible that other issues—such as Gaddafi’s fear after 9/11 that Libya might be next after Afghanistan for harboring terrorists or that possession of a nascent WMD program would be similar cause for invasion after Iraq—weighed heavily in Libyan strategic thinking. But sanctions did play a role in constraining the decision-making of Libya and its ability to improve its economy. Moreover, in the end, a desire to rid Libya of sanctions—which Libyan officials have themselves affirmed was part of the Libyan strategic calculus at the time—led Libyan officials and Gaddafi personally to make changes to Libyan policy in a manner that was conducive to international interests with respect to WMD proliferation and terrorism. For future relief scenarios, there are two recommendations for how best to evaluate sanctions relief performance.
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