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各国政府每年都会花费大量资源补贴能源产品的消费，产生许多不正当的影响。用于补贴的资源将公共预算从教育和基础设施投资等其他用途转移开。能源消费补贴，虽然往往是为了造福穷人，但通常是倒退的，因为大部分的福利是由那些消费水平最高、收入分配最高的人获得的。补贴计划也扭曲了能源市场，鼓励过度消费，同时将需求转向补贴产品，并远离那些定价更能反映实际市场状况的产品。这些问题是众所周知的，但总的补贴水平仍然很高。2013年，消费者和生产者补贴估计占全球国内生产总值（GDP）的0.7%（Coady等人。2015年）。这是因为，尽管补贴扭曲了政府和能源市场的职能，但它们在政治上往往非常受欢迎。面向消费者的补贴通常以稳定价格政策开始，通常以价格管制的形式进行，全世界有组织的消费者团体已经可信地证明，当基本产品的价格上升到不可接受的水平时，他们甚至会动员到暴乱的地步。以高尚、目标明确、确保价格稳定为出发点的小额补贴可能会变得根深蒂固。补贴的存在吸引了支持性的利益集团，他们在政治上动员起来，要求更大、更持久的补贴 补贴。因此，取消或重新定向补贴变得更加困难。事实上，能源补贴的问题并不是专家们对其反常影响的认识之一。相反，这是一个政治经济问题。本研究探讨能源补贴改革的政治经济学。多年来，特别是在本世纪能源价格居高不下的情况下，这个话题一直是许多政治议程的核心。2009年，20国集团（G 20）发达和新兴市场经济体呼吁所有国家逐步取消低效的化石燃料补贴，2012年g20重申了这一点（IMF 2013b）。
Every year governments spend vast sums of resources subsidizing the consumption of energy products, with many perverse effects. The resources spent on subsidies divert public budgets from other purposes such as investments in education and infrastructure. Energy consumption subsidies, although often intended to benefit the poor, are typically regressive as the bulk of the benefits accrue to those with the highest levels of consumption—those at the top of the income distribution. Subsidy programs also distort energy markets by encouraging excessive consumption overall while shifting demand toward subsidized products and away from those products whose pricing better reflects real market conditions. These problems are widely known, yet the total level of subsidy remains high. Consumer and producer subsidies were estimated at 0.7 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP) in 2013 (Coady et al. 2015). That’s because subsidies, for all their distortions to the function of government and energy markets, are often extremely popular politically. Consumer-facing subsidies usually begin as a price stabilization policy, typically in the form of price controls, and organized consumer groups around the world have credibly demonstrated they will mobilize—even to the point of riot—when the price of essential products rises to unacceptable levels. Subsidies that begin small with noble, well-focused purposes to ensure price stability can become entrenched. The presence of a subsidy attracts supportive interest groups that mobilize politically to press for larger, more permanent subsidies. As a result, removal or redirection of the subsidy becomes harder. Indeed, the problem of energy subsidies isn’t one of expert knowledge about their perverse effects. It is, rather, a problem of political economy. This study explores the political economy of energy subsidy reform. For years, especially in the 2000s when energy prices have been high, this topic has been central to many political agendas. In 2009, the Group of 20 (G-20) advanced and emerging market economies called for a phaseout of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies in all countries, and the G-20 reaffirmed this in 2012 (IMF 2013b). The experience with reform is highly varied. Currently as many as 27 countries are already reforming fossil fuel subsidies. In addition to subsidy reform, 40 countries and over 20 subnational jurisdictions now apply or have scheduled the introduction of a carbon price, and another 26 are actively considering one (Klevns, Stern, and Frejova 2015). Despite many failures at reform, there have also been striking successes. All told, subsidies today are US$117 billion per year lower than they would have been without recent reforms (IEA 2015). Indeed, a study on the political economy of energy subsidy reform is particularly relevant today because the steep decline in most energy commodity prices over the past two years has created an opportunity for reformers (CFR 2015; Klevns, Stern, and Frejova 2015). Lower prices for crude oil and products have meant that the subsidy needed to sustain retail price controls is much smaller. Indeed, in some countries, the continuation of price controls set in the era of high global prices means that, in effect, schemes that used to create subsidies are now raising the local cost of energy products relative to global markets.1 For commodity exporting countries in particular, low prices have created massive fiscal pressure on governments, which in turn has created urgent needs for reform. In short, many political leaders have seized these reform opportunities. What should be learned from their experiences? And how can reformers remove and reframe subsidies in ways that are politically durable—so that the problem of subsidies does not reappear when world market prices rise again? Relatively few World Bank reports provide a political economy perspective on energy subsidy reform. Most of the work by Bank teams on subsidies has focused on the sectoral efficiency, fiscal sustainability, optimal policy design, or distributional impacts of subsidies. For example, a recent internal stocktaking of analytical reports on energy subsidies by Bank teams over the past 10 years found that only a quarter of them undertake some analysis of the political economy of reforms. It is widely known that political economy is central to energy subsidy reform—a point made in an array of diverse studies (Beaton et al. 2013; Victor 2009). Yet, to date, most of the literature on energy subsidies has not engaged with political economy needs in a structured, detailed manner.
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