首页 > 资料下载 > 92/5000 美国汽车温室气体和燃料经济标准下的信贷交易新市场New Markets for Credit Trading under US Automobile Greenhouse Ga
92/5000   美国汽车温室气体和燃料经济标准下的信贷交易新市场New Markets for Credit Trading  under US Automobile  Greenhouse Ga 92/5000   美国汽车温室气体和燃料经济标准下的信贷交易新市场New Markets for Credit Trading  under US Automobile  Greenhouse Ga

92/5000 美国汽车温室气体和燃料经济标准下的信贷交易新市场New Markets for Credit Trading under US Automobile Greenhouse Ga

  • 资料类别:
  • 资料大小:
  • 资料编号:
  • 资料状态:
  • 更新时间:2021-09-22
  • 下载次数:
资料简介

美国企业平均燃油经济性(CAFE)法规的最新变化允许信贷银行和交易,这为降低满足严格的新标准的成本创造了新的机会。汽车制造商将首次能够在自己的汽车和卡车车队之间以及整个制造商之间交易信用额度,并且他们将能够在更长的时间内为信用额度进行银行存款。如果发展良好的信贷市场,降低法规成本的潜力可能很大。最新发展是,2012年开始的有关温室气体(GHG)排放的新法规与CAFE标准重叠,从而创建了两个单独的法规和两个单独的信贷市场,一个针对燃油经济性(由国家公路交通安全管理局监管),另一个针对燃油经济性。温室气体(由环境保护局管制)。我们发现,尽管应该将这两个法规统一起来,但是在信用的定义方式和交易方式上仍存在一些重要差异,从而给制造商增加了成本。我们审查了有关信贷市场运作状况的证据,包括信贷银行业务的范围以及交易的数量和价格。然后,我们评估以下因素干扰运作良好的市场的潜力:法规重叠,不需额外削减的成本,市场疲弱以及垄断权力的使用。我们发现缺少稳健交易的某些功能,并讨论了提高这些市场效率的一些可能方法。

Recent changes to the US Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) regulations that allow for credit banking and trading have created new opportunities for lowering the cost of meeting strict new standards. For the first time, automakers will be able to trade credits between their own car and truck fleets and across manufacturers, and they will be able to bank credits over longer time periods. The potential to lower the costs of the regulations could be large if well-functioning credit markets develop. A recent development is that new regulations starting in 2012 for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions overlap with the CAFE standards, creating two separate regulations and two separate credit markets, one for fuel economy (regulated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration) and one for greenhouse gases (regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency). We find that although the two regulations are supposed to be harmonized, there are some important differences in how credits are defined and how they can be traded, creating added costs for manufacturers. We review evidence on how well the credit markets are working, including the extent of credit banking and the number and price of trades. We then assess the potential for the following to interfere with well -functioning markets: overlapping regulations, reductions that are not additional, thin markets, and use of monopoly power. We find that some features of robust trading are missing and discuss some possible ways to improve efficiency in these markets.

资料截图