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持续低油价对伊朗的影响IMPLICATIONS OF SUSTAINED LOW OIL PRICES ON IRAN 持续低油价对伊朗的影响IMPLICATIONS OF SUSTAINED LOW OIL PRICES ON IRAN

持续低油价对伊朗的影响IMPLICATIONS OF SUSTAINED LOW OIL PRICES ON IRAN

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  • 更新时间:2021-09-17
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与许多其他主要石油出口国不同,2014年年中以来油价下跌对伊朗经济影响不大,至少与针对德黑兰的国际制裁制度相比。三年前对伊朗实施的制裁制度对伊朗经济造成了类似于现在其他产油国所面临的那种巨大冲击。因此,对伊朗来说,油价下跌是第二个次要的问题,就其所有影响而言,对伊朗经济而言,与其说是制裁,不如说是一个根本问题。自2013年2月以来,伊朗从石油销售中获得的收入有限,实际上就像是大幅降价。在美国的制裁下,在中国、印度、日本、韩国、台湾和土耳其持有伊朗石油收入的银行,除了支持双边贸易或购买人道主义物资外,都阻止了这些收入的使用或转移。通过五常加一(中国、法国、德国、俄罗斯、英国和美国)和伊朗的联合行动计划(JPOA),这种情况并没有得到改善,根据该计划,伊朗每月只能从国外获得7亿美元的石油收入。伊朗的进口已经转向有利于其剩余的石油客户,但仍然没有达到伊朗通过向他们出售石油所赚取的金额。其结果是,这6家客户银行的受限账户收入不断增加,而且伊朗必须做出计划,仿佛这些收入基本上无法获得。针对这一第一次根本性冲击,伊朗已经开始采取适当的政策应对措施。首先,伊朗人在2013年6月选举哈桑鲁哈尼(Hassan Rouhani)为总统,部分原因是他在竞选中承诺要整顿伊朗经济船。在哈塔米总统(1997年至2005年)的领导下,一小群技术官僚终于在德黑兰重新掌权,带来了更加理性的经济方针和政策。这包括但不限于努力改变 伊朗使用国家收入的方式,减少伊朗对石油收入的依赖,并解决与政府有关的腐败问题。鉴于上一届政府的管理得到了极大改善,鲁哈尼政府在通货膨胀和经济增长方面的数据不断提高,尽管创造就业和减少失业仍然是更难克服的障碍。作者总结说,鲁哈尼总统对伊朗经济的长期计划取决于取消制裁。伊朗可以从多样化中获益,摆脱对石油出口收入的依赖,但制裁也限制了伊朗获得必要支持和物资的能力,以建立可行的非石油出口部门。如果制裁措施继续实施,伊朗可以从油价上涨和改变国内燃料补贴方式,允许政府从国内消费中获取收入中获益。但如果不解除制裁,伊朗将无法实现增加就业、进一步降低通胀、使该国整体增长轨迹更接近潜力的目标。制裁只会造成太多问题,削弱伊朗为应对更广泛的经济挑战而进行政策调整的能力。

Unlike many other major petroleum exporting countries, the drop in oil prices since mid-2014 has affected the Iranian economy modestly, at least in comparison to the international sanctions regime in place against Tehran. The sanctions regime imposed against Iran three years ago created the sort of massive shock for the Iranian economy that is being faced now by other oil-producing states. The oil price drop was, therefore, a second, lesser issue for Iran that—for all of its effects—is less of a fundamental problem for the Iranian economy than the sanctions imposed against it. Iran’s limited access to the revenue from its oil sales since February 2013 acted, in effect, like a major price reduction. Under US sanctions, banks holding Iran’s oil revenues in China, India, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey have prevented these revenues from being used or transferred, other than in support of bilateral trade or for the purchase of humanitarian goods. This situation has not improved through P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and Iran’s Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), under which Iran only has access to $700 million of its oil revenues held abroad per month. Iran’s imports have shifted to favor its remaining oil customers but still has not equaled the amount of money that Iran has earned through oil sales to them. The result has been an accretion of revenues in restricted accounts in those six customers’ banks and a requirement for Iran to plan as if these revenues are largely inaccessible. In response to this first fundamental shock, Iran has already begun undertaking the appropriate policy response. First, Iranians elected Hassan Rouhani to the presidency in June 2013, in part in response to his campaign promises to right the Iranian economic ship. Through his election, a coterie of technocrats—last in office under President Khatami (1997–2005)—has returned to power in Tehran, bringing with them a more rational economic approach and policies. This has included but is not limited to efforts to change the manner in which Iran spends national revenue, reduce Iran’s dependence on the availability of oil revenues, and address problems of government-related corruption. Given vastly improved management over the last administration, Rouhani’s government is consistently posting better numbers regarding inflation and economic growth, although job creation and unemployment reduction remain more difficult hurdles to overcome. The authors conclude that President Rouhani’s longterm plans for Iran’s economy, however, hinge on sanctions being removed. Iran could benefit from diversifying away from dependence on oil for export revenue, but sanctions have also limited Iran’s ability to obtain support and materiel necessary to create viable, nonoil export sectors. If sanctions were to remain in place, Iran could benefit from higher oil prices and from changing its approach to domestic fuel subsidies to permit the government to collect revenues from internal consumption. But without sanctions relief, Iran will not be able to achieve its goals of increasing employment and bringing inflation down further and bringing the country’s overall growth trajectory closer to its potential. Sanctions simply create too many problems and impair Iran’s ability to undertake policy adjustments to address its broader economic challenges.

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